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Commentary on Senate Confirmation
of Supreme Court Justices
By THoMAs P. LEwIS*
I think the high quality of the papers presented and the
credentials of their authors are a fitting tribute to Sid Ulmer,'
and I'm certainly happy to have a role in this symposium dedi-
cated to him.
As a law professor, I am going to take a different approach
than the political science professors in the Symposium have
taken. As I interpret what I have heard and read in the papers
that have been presented, there is general agreement that over
time, considering our two hundred year history, ideology has
not been a dominating force in the confirmation process. Yet,
there is also general agreement on the proposition that once
controversy erupts, and builds, for whatever reason, ideology
then becomes the major factor in explaining how the senators
vote. I found the Segal paper interesting and rather persuasive
in its explanation of how the emergence of controversy, depend-
ent on the presence of nonideological factors, clears the way for
ideological disagreement with a nominee to come forward. Of
course, I think there is always the possibility that a senator will
conceal his disapproval of the nominee's ideology or judicial
philosophy by grounding his challenge on a neutral factor, such
as the nominee's qualifications.
I wondered when I read the political science papers what
their purpose was, whether it was simply to inform us, or, as
suggested in the Segal article, to offer to presidents or senators
a basis for prediction. In that article's example, a president might
change the sequence of nominations to influence results. I, too,
am inclined to think, as the authors suggest, that had the Bork
and Scalia nominations been reversed in sequence, both might
have cleared the Senate, particularly given the shift in the control
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of the Senate in the interval between the nominations.
It occurs to me that some further hypotheses along this line
could be suggested, one of which has been suggested by Profes-
sor Caldeira. Mr. Rader mentions that the Haynsworth nomi-
nation came after the Fortas chief justice nomination and the
ensuing Senate ethical inquiry. I don't know if there was any
retaliation at work, but was the Haynsworth nomination affected
by this accident of timing? Timing, in the sense of the number
of nominations that a president has made when a new nominee
comes forward, particularly as that relates to the "balance" on
the Court, offers another hypothesis. If the order of Justice
Scalia's and Judge Bork's nominations had been reversed, and
Bork had succeeded, Scalia would have come forward as the
"swing" nominee. Scalia shows up in the estimates composed
by the political scientists as more conservative than Bork. We're
told that there wasn't a hint of anything in Scalia's background
that would cast any doubt upon his qualifications. The idea is
that a nonideological factor to trigger controversy was not avail-
able in Scalia's case. But could nothing have been uncovered if
a harder look had been taken? If Justice Scalia had been pre-
sented as the swing nominee, would a harder look have been
taken?
Justice Scalia's actual nomination presents another timing
hypothesis, the exhaustion factor. Was a harder look at Scalia
not taken because of the energy that had been expended in the
Rehnquist chief justice inquiry? The exhaustion factor presents
still another-not altogether serious-possibility. Might Bork have
been approved if the Reagan administration had dared to nom-
inate Ginsburg first, keeping in its pocket the knowledge that he
had smoked marijuana, in case they had to disclose this infor-
mation at the last moment to make sure he would not be
confirmed? Then, with everyone exhausted from trying to defeat
Ginsburg (the swing), nominate Bork and hope that Bork be-
comes an Anthony Kennedy. Maybe Bork wouldn't have gone
through as easily as Kennedy did, but his chances might have
been increased.
Beyond these reactions to the papers, I want to pose a final
set of inquiries. There is some agreement among the speakers
that we have entered a new era, perhaps triggered by the Bork
hearings. The Segal article hints that there has been more focus
on ideology since the desegregation cases. Whenever it started,
the new era is, as Mr. Rader noted, a change from a look
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generally at ideology to a focused look in a forecasting mode,
in which the effort is to predict, "what will this nominee as a
justice do-for us, against us," whoever "us" might be. In
relation to this observation I pose the question, what should the
Senate do with respect to ideology? Mr. Rader hopes that Sen-
ators will exercise restraint, and he sees, I think, the potential
ruination of the Court if the Senate comes down too hard or
too frequently with this kind of inquiry.
I doubt that the new era has much to do with the desegre-
gation cases, but I do think it has something to do with events
that began roughly at the time of those cases, that is, when
Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed to the Court in 1954.
If one thinks about the Court and constitutional law in the pre-
1954 era, a turning point in constitutional interpretation can be
marked. In the early 1950s, the bulk of a constitutional law
casebook was still given to cases dealing primarily with the
structure of government and the powers of government in a
federal system. Prior to 1954, constitutional development of the
Bill of Rights, through Supreme Court interpretation, was glacial
in nature. William Brennan joined Warren on the Court in 1956,
and the two became close allies. Beginning in the 1960s a head
of steam that would power rapid expansion of rights and liberties
under the Bill of Rights was fueled by these Justices.
Chief Justice Warren's biographers, at least one of whom
compares him in greatness to Chief Justice Marshall, praise as
his hallmark his "fairness" and the application of his standards
of fairness to the judging of cases. 2 They candidly point to cases
in which the results depended on his standard of fairness rather
than on the language and "legislative history" of constitutional
or statutory provisions. One of Warren's biographers credits him
with "remaking the Court in his image." I think the identity of
the chief architect (Warren or Brennan) is open to debate, but
can anyone doubt that the Court was remade?
Prior to this time, the Court had a number of doctrines that
slowed the development of constitutional case law, for example,
the doctrine of "standing"-who can sue as a plaintiff, and
what issues a particular plaintiff can litigate-and the doctrines
2 B. SciwARTz, SrmPn CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His Stnicaim CouRT-A
JUDIciAL BIOGRAPHY (1983) (Schwartz locates Warren in the "judicial pantheon" with
John Marshall); G. WiroT, EARL WARREN, A PUtsic Lim (1982).
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of ripeness and mootness. Moreover, there were presumptions
of constitutionality and rules designed to avoid constitutional
issues, for example, the rule calling for the interpretation of
statutes to avoid constitutional issues where possible. Chief Justice
Warren was impatient with-and not much interested in-these
doctrines, and the country was a little impatient with some of
them as well. With Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, a
case might have taken nine years to get to the Supreme Court,
and yet, be remanded without a decision on the merits because
of some technical flaw or gap in the record. Chief Justice Warren
was impatient with such restraint, and we see, through the
Warren-Brennan era, substantial modifications in the content or
application of these doctrines.
I know the following is open to debate, but I think there
was more commitment during the pre-Warren era to the Marbury
v. Madison3 tradition that constitutional case law is a byproduct,
not the end purpose, of the Court's role. The Court occasionally
has to face a constitutional issue because it is necessary to the
resolution of a case between real, adverse parties. There was a
gradual shift through the Warren-Brennan era to a conviction,
occasionally admitted, that the Court's primary role is to give
the public guidance as to the meaning of the Constitution as the
Court sees it. The "case" is a vehicle for the Court; the goal is
not so much to resolve the dispute between particular parties as
it is to govern the country in the sphere of the Constitution. 4
Large segments of the population applaud the results reached
during and following the Warren-Brennan era. But even while
applauding, must we consider some possible costs? The idea is
abroad that we now have a number of constitutional rights,
rights that have come to be regarded as very important to those
affected, but that have no real anchor in constitutional text or
history. If so, what does this mean for us today?
I watched most of the Bork hearings, and what I found to
be significant was the tenor of the questions and the testimony
by the senators and witnesses in opposition. There appeared to
be an assumption that judges and justices write on a more or
1 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
4 As the Court's caseload grew during its history it was inevitable that its docket
would increasingly become issue-driven. The shift in emphasis should be understood as
one of degree; debate will center on whether the Court has shifted too actively toward
a governing role.
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less clean slate. The outcomes of cases seemed to be the only
criteria by which judges are to be measured. If a judge can be
associated with a result that went against an identifiable interest,
one can then attribute to that judge a hostility toward that
identified interest. A result is never the product of any other
values that may have been stated in an opinion. In Bork's
situation, some of this result-oriented analysis was applied to
cases, but probably more was applied to his nonjudicial writings.
Bork was portrayed simply as being against or for this or that
interest group. (I am not a close student of Bork's writings or
his case decisions. My point goes to the tenor of the hearings,
not to the ultimate merits of his positions.)
Placards at a recent address delivered by Justice Scalia were
instructive in this respect. 5 The Justice was placarded as an
oppressor; a major complaint was his dissent in a case in which
the majority reached a result that many applaud. Justice Scalia's
dissent quarreled sharply both with the majority's approach to
statutory interpretation and with its reasoning. His critics were
moved by the fact that he cast his vote against a disadvantaged
group. 6
In his address, Justice Scalia said that the justices will ulti-
mately reflect the people. 7 This is an insightful observation: the
Constitution will come to mean what the people think it means,
because the justices will be drawn from the people. I would add
the observation, though, that what the people think the Consti-
tution means, and more particularly, what they perceive as the
role of the justices, are influenced, even largely determined, by
what the justices say and do. Wherever we enter this circle, if
the perception emerges that the justices do, indeed, write on a
clean slate, i.e., that they are not hedged about by constitutional
or statutory text or various concepts that relate to the process
I Justice Scalia delivered the biannual Swinford Lecture, sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law and the Kentucky Bar Association, on September
14, 1988.
6 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 107 S. Ct.
1442 (1987). Justice Scalia accused the majority of inverting the meaning of statutory
language that he felt spoke with "a clarity which, had it not proven so unavailing, one
might well recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship." Id. at 1465 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia does not omit policy considerations as he sees them from his
opinion, but the more constant theme of his opinion is that the Court's result is based
on indefensible statutory interpretation, specious reasoning, and the misuse of precedents.
See id. at 1465-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Scalia Lecture, supra note 5.
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of litigation, but sit to administer justice according to their own
standards of fairness, what then?
I believe this perception of judicial function was at work in
the Bork hearings. But if this is the perception, couple it with
life tenure for those appointed as justices, and what can we
expect the Senate to do? This perception may explain the emer-
gence of the "constituency" problem mentioned during the ear-
lier presentations. At the Bork hearings there was a massive
organization of lobbying groups. If it is perceived that the Court
simply reaches results on the basis of what the justices believe
is fair-on issues that touch so many of us-without any other
basic restraints, it is obvious that constituencies will develop
around certain types of nominees and marshal their forces to
sway the Senate. The Senate will have less and less choice about
the wisdom of thoroughly politicizing the confirmation process.
If such Senate inquiries should lead to the ruination of the
Court, as Mr. Rader fears they will, the ultimate question is:
who should be blamed?
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